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Bidding for Complex Projects: Evidence From the Acquisitions of IT
Services
Summary
Competitive bidding (as auctions) is commonly used to procure goods and services.
Public buyers are often mandated by law to adopt competitive procedures to ensure
transparency and promote full competition. Recent theoretical literature, however,
suggests that open competition can perform poorly in allocating complex projects. In
exploring the determinants of suppliers’ bidding behavior in procurement auctions for
complex IT services, we find results that are consistent with theory. We find that price
and quality do not exhibit the classical tradeoff one would expect: quite surprisingly,
high quality is associated to low prices. Furthermore, while quality is mainly driven by
suppliers’ experience, price is affected more by the scoring rule and by the level of
expected competition. These results might suggest that (scoring) auctions fail to
appropriately incorporate buyers’ complex price/quality preferences in the tender
design.
Keywords: Procurement Auctions, Scoring Rules, IT Contracts, Price/Quality Ratio
JEL Classification: D44, D86, H51, H57
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1. Introduction
Contracting authorities often use competitive bidding1 to select providers of IT
services. Competitive bidding was already popular among private procurers, and today
is a central principle for public procurement regulations worldwide (in particular in
Europe and in the U.S.).2 Competition in fact allows buyers to achieve cost
minimization and to ensure transparency.
When projects are complex, however, economic theory suggests that competition may
not be the best allocation mechanism. Goldberg (1977) argued that using auctions for
complex transactions may prevent the parties to exchange important pre-contractual
information. More recently, Manelli and Vincent (1995) show that bargaining
dominates competition when the buyer is unsure about the quality the supplier will
deliver (quality is unobservable). Empirical evidence on construction procurement
highlights the potential limits of sealed-bidding. These stem from unexploited useful
communication between buyer and supplier (Bajari, McMillan and Tadelis, 2006) and
to the difficulties in capturing post-contract adaptation costs (Bajari and Tadelis,
2001).3
The critical point for the buyer in designing competitive bidding for complex projects
is to precisely describe (many) quality dimensions that are often unverifiable and that
can sometimes be only partially known at the bidding stage. Talks with practitioners,
for instance, suggest that the outcome of an new software for a large organization (e.g.,
payroll management) typically depends on the ability of the project managers to set up
a “working and flexible team” and that of single developers/programmers to transform
the buyer’s requirements in a good software. Although ability may be inferred by some
measure of quality (e.g., errors during running) the real functioning of the software can
be learnt only at the end of the job, when it is rather costly to recover development
mistakes.

1

The open procedure is one of the procedures provided for by EU Directive 18/2004. Other procedure
are the “negotiated procedure” and the “restricted procedure”.
2
See the EU Directive 2004/18 and the U.S. Federal Acquisition Regulation, 2005. The FAR 2005 (Part
6) explicitly recommends to adopt full and open competition, with certain limited exceptions.
3
Although the topic of the paper is contract design, both economic and construction management
literature suggest a strong link between cost reimbursement contracts and the use of negotiations,
whereas fixed price contracts seem to be awarded by competitive bidding. The link is also present in the
U.S. FAR.
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The task of course becomes even more complicated when the buyer adopts a scoring
auction to award the contract.4 Scoring auctions are rather common in the practice of
public procurement and their use is supported by many procurement regulations. The
scoring auction is particularly appropriate for commercial/standardized items (as PC
and printers), i.e., when quality is verifiable and thus the buyer’s price/quality
preferences can be well represented by a scoring rule (see Che, 1993).5 Scoring
auctions instead do not appear suitable for complex projects, as they “force” the buyer
to give a precise shape (the scoring rule) to complex, often unknown, price/quality
preferences.6 In these cases, problems may also arise for suppliers in setting their
bidding strategies. When competing to provide a commercial item, any supplier easily
computes the monetary cost of improving his score on the basis of his internal
cost/efficiency. In bidding for the provision of a laptop, for instance, if increasing the
score of 1 point implies lowering price of $500 or, alternatively, offering X additional
power (e.g. RAM) at the cost of $400, the supplier will for sure opt for the latter to
save $100.7 In the case of complex, custom tailored projects (such as IT
solutions/services to be provided to a large buyer) it is not clear how this trade-off, at
least at the margin, could work. For instance, a reliable cost estimate of developing
new SW applications requires the supplier to know ex-ante the types and number of
functionalities (complexity of SW) and what are existing IT infrastructures (e.g.,
servers) new applications must be compatible with. Lacking precise information, it is
of course hard for the supplier to estimate how many consultants (money) will be
necessary to develop the SW, and thus how the price bid could be traded-off with
quality dimensions (e.g., completion time, days of ex-post training for users, more
advanced programming languages or developing technologies).

4

In public procurement, scoring auctions are known as the awarding criteria of the most economically
advantageous tender (MEAT).
5
The rule assesses whether one proposal’s technical superiority is worth the higher price, and it allows
the buyer to select the best “value for money” supplier (highest score supplier).
6
Following this point, Che (forthcoming) discusses the issue of non-contractible quality and possible
solutions, as option contracts and reputation mechanisms. Also notice that the recent theoretical
developments produced by Asker and Cantillon (2008) on the properties of scoring auctions pass
inevitably through the assumption of perfectly verifiable (and thus contractible) quality.
7
This is true when the scoring rules governing the price/quality tension have certain properties (e.g.,
linearity in the price dimension). Dini, Pacini and Valletti (2006) analyze in more detail the properties of
linear and non-linear scoring rules.
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In Italy, the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) selects IT services contractors
through scoring auctions. Consip8 acts in the behalf of the MEF, being in charge to
organize the tenders and to award the contracts. IT services contracts are often “general
purpose”, or “framework contracts”, i.e., include a large variety of activities – from
simple maintenance to developments of new applications, from IT consultancy to
integration of complex systems. Quality proposals consist in providing effective and
flexible teams of professionals and technological solutions to best fit the various needs
of the MEF. The selected supplier is required to adapt its initial organizational set-up
to development tasks that will be more clearly specified during the procurement
relationship.
In this paper we aim at moving one first step in understanding suppliers’ behavior in
bidding for complex projects. The general issue we address is what happens when
competitive mechanisms are used in settings for which the theory suggests that other
mechanisms (e.g., negotiation) could be preferable. More precisely, our research
questions are: can observed bids tell us something about how well the awarding
mechanism captures the buyer’s price/quality trade-offs in complex projects? Is there a
relationship between price and quality emerging from bids? What are the most
important factors explaining bidding behavior, i.e., submitted price/quality ratios? How
do bidders respond to the incentives generated by different scoring rules?
To answer these questions we exploit a unique dataset of contracts for IT development
and consultancy that Consip (the Italian Public Procurement Agency) awarded on
behalf of the MEF. In particular, we use the complete set of 20 contracts awarded by
Consip in the period 1999–2007 in the sector of IT development and consultancy.
We find no evidence of a tension between price and quality in submitted
price/technical bids: data exhibit a puzzling negative correlation between quality and
price bids, such that higher quality is associated to lower prices. These results put at
least some doubts on the possibility for scoring auctions to appropriate capture
complex price/quality trade-offs.
Regression analysis also shows that the nature of the scoring rule and past experience
are important determinants of submitted quality/price ratios. However, while quality is
mainly driven by suppliers’ experience, price is influenced by the scoring rule and by

8

Since 1997 Consip S.p.A. (the Italian Public Procurement Agency) is mandated to select suppliers and
manage IT contracts on behalf of the MEF.

4
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2009

5

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 245 [2009]

the level of expected competition. This provides some support to the conjecture that
quality and price bidding may respond to rather different elements.
Finally, we find that the distribution of scores for technical proposals is significantly
less dispersed when evaluation committees are composed of “outsiders” (mainly nonIT persons) rather than “insiders”, suggesting that in the former case competition
shifted more towards the economic aspect of the contract. Results offer several insights
for policy considerations on IT services scoring auction design.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys the related empirical
literature. Section 3 describes the procurement environment, the characteristics of
contracts and the role of Consip and the MEF. It also provides a description of the
dataset and some basic descriptive statistics. Section 4 illustrates the results from
regression analysis testing for price/quality trade-off in observed bids. Section 5
explores the determinants of price/quality ratios, while section 6 investigates the role
of committees in explaining the variability of technical scores. Section 7 concludes the
paper and summarizes some policy indications.

2. Related Literature
This paper is related to the empirical literature on bidding in procurement auctions.
Important results have been achieved in the field of structural approach to auctions.
Several authors estimated structural auction models addressing the issue of common
value vs. private value (e.g. Athey, Susan and Haile 2006, Paarsch 1992, Guerre,
Perrigne and Vuong 2000), often finalized to find evidence of the winner’s curse in
both one dimensional and multidimensional procurement auctions (Hong and Shum
2002). This field of research exploits repeated auctions data (e.g., timber auctions), and
relies on frameworks where bidders’ behavior can be well enough incorporated in a
structural model. A structural approach allows the researcher to identify the
distribution of bidders’ values and thus to investigate important issues such as the
optimality of reserve prices or the mark ups realized by bidders.
The cross-section nature of our data, as well as the complexity of the environment
prevent the use of structural approach and suggest the adoption of reduced form
models. In their recent paper, Asker and Cantillon (2008) highlight serious difficulties

5
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from the standpoint of identification9 that in our settings would be even more
complicated as observed scores do not reflect precise quality/technical characteristics –
verifiable quality is one key assumption in their model – rather they arise from
discretional evaluation of projects (unverifiable quality).
However, the nature of data allows us to address issues that others have not yet been
able to address. To some extent these issues are closer to the ones investigated by the
literature on the bidding behavior for complex/incomplete contracts. There are several
papers exploring renegotiation and adaptation costs – most of them bounded to the
field of public works and construction industry. For instance, Bajari, Houghton and
Tadelis (2007) and Bajari and Tadelis (2001) try to measure such costs in the
procurement of highways paving works in the U.S.. The limitations to use auctions,
when projects are complex and contractual design is incomplete, suggest that
negotiations may be more attractive than auctions. By the way, Bajari, McMillan and
Tadelis (2008) compare auctions with negotiations by examining a comprehensive data
set of private sector building contracts in the U.S.. Crocker and Reynolds (1993) use
Air Force engine procurement contracts to show how the degree of observed
contractual completeness reflects the desire of the parties to minimize the economic
costs associated with ex-post contractual exchange. Several other papers have studied
bidding for construction and highway contracts (e.g., Porter and Zona 1993) with the
goal to isolate transaction costs due to ex-post renegotiation.
Our perception is that there is a lack (of valuable data and hence) of understanding of
several other important issues in procurement. While theoretical works advanced the
research on the properties of multidimensional procurements (Dagupta and Spulberg
1989, Che 1993, Branko 1997, Asker and Cantillon 2008), and studied the conditions
under which scoring auctions can do better than other mechanisms (Asker and
Cantillon 2006), empirical investigations on the role of scoring rules on bidding
behavior are completely absent. In particular, how bidders effectively trade-off price
and quality? What is the role of critical elements of the tender design, such as the
nature of the scoring rules or bidders’ experience, in the bidding behavior? Attempts to
investigate the role of competitive tender design and scoring rules on bidders’ behavior
are in Lundberg (2005), although in a completely different setting. In a framework
where suppliers bid to supply cleaning services to local public administrations, the
9

For instance, “the observed information (the scores) is one dimensional while the information to be
inferred is multidimensional” (Asker and Cantillon, 2008, p. 81).
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author’s most important result is no evidence of differences in winning bids depending
on the auction format (simultaneous multiple lots vs. single lots). Zhong (2007) is the
work most related to ours. The author explores some key issues in online procurement
auctions for manufacturing goods from a large buyer in the high-tech industry. He
characterizes the suppliers’ bidding behavior to examine the effect of incumbency on
bidding. His most interesting findings are: i) the buyer bias towards the incumbent
suppliers, the buyer, however, is not committed to the final tender ranking; ii)
incumbent has a price premium; iii) incumbent winners quality is higher, on average,
than the quality buyer had before the auction, while non-incumbent winner's quality is
lower; iv) using field data of procurement auctions for legal services, he shows that
prices are on average reduced after dynamic bidding events.

3. The Institutional context
3.1. What is Consip
Consip S.p.A. is one of the first European Central purchasing bodies to raise the
challenge of rationalization of public spending for the procurement of goods and
services. It was created in 1997 to provide the MEF with ICT solutions, technologies
and services, and to promote IT change management within its Departments and
peripheral offices. So, one important task of Consip was (and still is) to manage ICT
acquisitions to maintain the whole IT infrastructure supporting the MEF activities. The
Italian Financial Law (December 23, 1999 n. 488) laid down the foundations for the
“Rationalization Program for Public Spending on Goods and Services”, charging
Consip with the additional task of implementing the program and working as central
procurement agency for all the public administrations.7
A specific three-year based agreement regulates the afore-mentioned outsourcing
relationship. The agreement mandates Consip to perform several activities: from
demand analysis and identification of key IT solutions to suppliers selection, but also
contract management and monitoring. With regard to suppliers selection, Consip is
mandated to: define needs/solutions, organize the tender, appoint the evaluating

7

The program is currently carried out through two main tools: framework contracts and the Italian
Government’s e-Platform (MEPA), an online e-platform for low-value purchases. Framework contracts
are stipulated for higher–volume acquisitions from suppliers who are awarded the contract as a result of
an open competitive procedure. The online marketplace (MEPA), instead, allows public administrations
to procure low-value items with fast and “slim” procedures (request for quotation and one-stop orders).

7
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committee, evaluate the suppliers’ proposals, award and manage the contract and
monitor suppliers’ performance.
Contracts either refer to specific/small activities (e.g., development services for a
single MEF Department or over a specific MEF architecture - “vertical projects”), or to
larger projects involving many activities merged into a big cross-Departments contract.
Some of the most important contracts are of the second type, that is “framework
contracts” or “general purpose”, including a large variety of activities, such as IT
consultancy, development and maintenance of IT applications, databases, internet and
intranet websites. Our dataset is essentially based on these general purpose contracts.
In compliance with the EU Directive 2004/18 all these contracts are awarded through
open competitive tendering. The Italian law incorporates the EU rules, establishing the
most economically advantageous tender (MEAT) and the lowest price as the main
criteria to award contracts for services. However, IT contracts are usually awarded by
the MEF with the MEAT.
Quality is crucial for every IT services contract. Very often the weight of the technical
side is equal or above 50% and evaluation of proposals is always based on a significant
discretional component.
The “typical” contract requires the contractor to set up an adequate team of
professionals, resources, IT equipments and technological solutions to achieve both
high quality standards and sufficient flexibility to manage heterogeneous activities.
The three milestones of evaluation criteria are the organizational proposal (teams),
technological solutions and improvements over key performance indicators. To each
milestone is assigned a weight (score/points). Within each single milestone, points are
allocated to several sub-criteria. Basically, the milestones are:
•

Organization, e.g., how resources are organized and deployed to best perform
tasks; solutions to maintain stability and provide flexibility to working teams;
how activities are split among partners in case of joint bidding or
subcontracting;

•

Solutions, e.g., software, methodologies and tests for development activities,
best practices for the implementation of big projects involving many “Function
Points”;10

10

Function Points are a software metrics to quantify estimating software development. Function Point
Analysis is considered a reliable method for measuring the size of computer software. In addition to
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•

Quality, e.g., quality plans, documents released, improvements over Key
Performance Indicators (KPI), skills of professionals and consultants, etc.

Contracts are fixed-price, providing for some performance incentives based on the
achievement of certain KPI thresholds.
As anticipated above, the contracts provide for a large variety of activities, e.g.:
•

evolutionary and corrective maintenance of applications;

•

development over existing applications;

•

development of new applications;

•

consultancy on IT services and data monitoring;

•

management of websites (development of new accessible websites, publishing,
etc.);

•

management of data warehouse and databases;

•

help-desk and end-user assistance/support levels;

•

corporate assistance/support/consultancy (Ministry of Economy and his
Cabinet).

To best manage all activities, contracts usually require the contractor to deploy
different types of professionals: the Chief of the project, a list of selected senior
consultants, and teams composed of several other professionals, such as junior
consultants, function analysts, programmers, product/technology specialists, data
warehouse designers and enterprise data administrators.
Depending on the size of the contract and the number of departments/users involved,
supplier’s team may be composed of even more than 100 professionals. The
contractor’s team operate in harness with dedicated people from the MEF and Consip
project managers and monitoring unit.

3.2. Bids’ evaluation: role of committees
Contracts for services are usually awarded with the most economically advantageous
tender criterion (MEAT). This configures a sealed-bid first score procurement auction.
Technical and price bids are simultaneously submitted by each supplier.

measuring output, Function Point Analysis is useful in estimating projects, measuring productivity, and
communicating functional requirements.
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Submitted bids are evaluated by ad-hoc committees. The committee checks whether
competing suppliers have the minimum technical/economic requirements indicated in
the solicitation documents. All suppliers fulfilling the minimum requirements are
admitted to the subsequent phase. In this phase, the committee evaluates the technical
bids of all the admitted suppliers. As mentioned before, in the case of IT contracts, the
technical bid consists in an organizational proposal of teams and resources which are
(discretionally) evaluated by committee. The committee judges how the organizational
setting and proposed solutions are able to perform the various activities established in
the contract. At the end of the evaluation process, the committee draws the final
technical scores. These scores are disclosed in a public session with the suppliers. In
the same public session the committee opens the sealed envelopes containing the price
bids and publicly announces the submitted prices.11
The committee only evaluates technical proposals. Despite discretion powers it on
assigning the score within the sub-criteria indicated in section 3.1, the committee is
committed to the maximum score for each macro-criterion, as well as to the specific
scoring rule for price bids indicated in the solicitation documents.12
Submitted price bids are not known during this evaluation process and are discovered
by the committee and the bidding suppliers in the same time during the public session.
After announcing the technical scores and prices, the committee computes the financial
scores, by inserting the submitted prices in the scoring rule.13 The total score (and thus
the final ranking) is computed by summing the technical and the financial scores for
each supplier.
The composition of the committees is regulated by the law. Until 2006 the legislation
established members to be selected among both public administration’s employees
(“insiders”) and external professionals, such as university professors or recognized
experts (“outsiders”). Since 2007 committees are of all insiders. The number of
members can be either 3 or 5 depending on the complexity of the supply.14
Our dataset enables us to make some comparisons between the two regimes and to see
whether, other things being equal, there is a difference in evaluating technical
11

In this phase suppliers are able to compute their own total scores and the score of competing suppliers,
and thus to find out the winner’s identity.
12
For instance, if the solicitation document provides for up to 5 points for “organization” the committee
is free to assign between 0 and 5 depending on the quality of the supplier’s proposal over that aspect, but
is not allowed to assign more than 5 points. This, of course, holds for each technical criterion.
13
The scoring rule, as well as the score of each technical evaluation criteria, are public information as
they must be disclosed in the solicitation documents.
14
The rules on committees apply to Consip as well as to all other public administrations.
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proposals. The first contracts (1999-2002) and than the latest ones (2007) were
evaluated by insiders committees, while all the others by mixed committees (insiders
and outsiders). Our conjecture is that, being in depth with the details of the contract,
internal committees are likely to evaluate technical proposals with more accuracy than
mixed committees. As we will see, some patterns arise in the analysis of technical
scores distribution.

4. Overview of the dataset
Our analysis is based on a unique set of 20 contracts13 that Consip awarded in the
period 1998–2007. The total value of the contracts analyzed amounts to €428,7
millions, 4,6% of total Italian expenditure on IT services in 2006 (private and public
sectors amount to €9,3 billions).
Economic value is only one aspect characterizing the importance of such data of
contracts. First, we are able to address issues not yet empirically explored. One is the
impact of scoring rules on bidding behavior. Second, these contracts are for
performing strategic activities, as they often relate to critical (IT) MEF infrastructures,
such as the ones supporting the Public Balance Sheet and the definition of Budget
Laws. Moreover, despite the set of 20 contracts yields a limited number of
observations, namely 132 price/technical pairs, these are the whole set of procurement
auctions on IT services run by Consip in behalf of MEF since its creation in 1997. In
other words, we do not deal with observations “drawn” from a sample of contracts,
rather with the whole set of existing contracts.
One last element worth highlighting is the number and the importance of bidding
suppliers. Bidders include the major worldwide players in IT, such as Accenture,
Almaviva, Enterprise Digital Architects (EDA), EDS, Engineering, IBM, Siemens.
These are the most important suppliers in the IT sector, covering almost the entire
market share in Italy and Europe, as reported in Figure 1 and Figure 2. Figure 3 reports
the number of times these suppliers submitted a bid in the set of contracts we

13

In some circumstances the competitive tender is split in different lots. Each lot is a different contract
and thus considered as separated competitive framework. See Grimm, Pacini, Spagnolo and Zanza
(2006) for an in-depth discussion on lots division and competition in procurement.
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considered. As the reader can note, the most important IT services provision
companies compete to provide IT services to the MEF.
Figure 1-2 – Revenues from main IT services suppliers operating in Italy (2006)

Figure 3 – Overall tender participation from main IT services suppliers operating in Italy.
Overall participation
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4.1. Some statistics
Many issues analyzed below are widely discussed in the common practice of
procurement. However, even at level of simple descriptive statistics, there is no
systematic evidence about the direction of the effects that practitioners and economists
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have been suggesting by years. For instance, while many procurers are aware about the
potential adverse effects of large contract value (high reserve price) on participation of
(especially small) firms, to our knowledge there is no study attempting to test this
relationship.15 Similar considerations can be made about contract value and joint
bidding, as well as the effects of supplier’s experience/learning on the chances to win
future competitions.

4.1.1 Bids and scores
The simple ranking of contracts by technical scores16 raffled off shows that quality is
very important. We note that 60% of contracts are skewed on technical side. In the
majority of lots quality weights at least 60%. Contracts in which quality is at least 50%
are 85% of total contracts.
Table 1 – Frequency distribution of available Technical Score

α

<50

50-59

60-69

≥70

N.

3

5

8

4

0.15

0.25

0.40

0.20

%

Table 2 – Frequency distribution of available Financial Score

β

≤30

31-40

41-50

>50

N.

4

8

5

3

%

0.20

0.40

0.25

0.15

Symmetrically, the frequency distribution of financial scores shows that 60% of lots
has been faced with scores until 40 points, or 85% under 50 financial score.
Table 3 and 4 show the frequency distribution of observed relative scores effectively
achieved by the competitors. Relative score equals actual score/maximum score. The
cumulated distribution is plotted in Figure 4. The central technical score ranges (51-60
and 61-70) represents the 50% of technical proposals, whereas 62% of technical
proposals obtained scores over 60. Overall average technical score is 66.17, median is
65. Standard deviation is 14.67, showing a significant dispersion if we consider the

15

In the U.S., the importance of the issue was recognized by the creation of the Small Business
Administration (SBA, www.sba.gov) already in 1953. The SBA is an independent agency of the Federal
Government in charge to provide support to small business. The role of SBA is critical in public
procurement since it monitors that contracting agencies fulfil the “set-aside” goals provided by FAR
(2005, Subpart 19.5 — Set-Asides for Small Business). The goal was established to protect small (and
disadvantaged) business in the market for public procurement contracts.
16
Henceforth, we will use score(s) and points(s) interchangeably. This holds also for lot(s) and
contract(s).
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best and the worst technical proposals. But statistics also highlight the low number of
bidders (9 out of 132) achieving the highest score range (91-100).
Table 3 – Frequency distribution of relative technical score
rank

<=40

41-50

51-60

61-70

71-80

81-90

N.

5

13

31

36

19

19

91-100
9

%

0.04

0.10

0.23

0.27

0.14

0.14

0.07

Summary Statistics
Mean

Median

St. Deviation

66.17

65.00

14.67

Table 4 – Frequency distribution of relative financial score
rank

<=40

41-50

51-60

61-70

71-80

81-90

91-100

N.

18

15

8

9

15

24

43

%

0.14

0.11

0.06

0.07

0.11

0.18

0.33

Summary Statistics
Mean

Median

St. Deviation

72.60

80.81

25.43

Things are quite different if we analyze the frequency distribution of relative financial
scores. The first two higher ranks (81-90 and 91-100) together account for the 51% of
proposals, while the 75% are over 50. Furthermore, both the mean and the standard
deviation (72.60 and 25.43 respectively) are greater with respect to the technical
scores. This might also be due to a sort of “bias” in the mapping from price to score
when using “interdependent” scoring (see paragraph 4.1.3 for more details on scoring
rules). For instance, although one supplier’s bid is slightly above the average, the score
differential between her bid and the average bid can be very large when using “average
scoring”. Anyway, data show clearly that bidders seem to achieve higher ranks of
financial scores more easily rather than analogous levels of technical scores.
Figure 4 – Cumulative function of relative technical and financial scores
1,20

Cumulative

1,00
0,80
0,60
0,40
0,20
0,00
<=40

up50

up60

up70

Rel Tech Score

up80

up90

up100

Rel Financial Score
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A noteworthy finding is that suppliers do not win submitting outstanding financial
proposals. The score matrix below shows that the winner obtains the highest technical
score in 16 cases out of 20, whereas only in 7 cases out of 20 she gets the highest
financial score. This suggests that suppliers mainly win contracts by promising
relatively more (ex-ante) quality rather than low price, so much so they win 11 times
thanks to the best technical score, but not to achieve the best financial ones.
Score Matrix
Winners’ Technical Score
Winners’
Financial
Score

Best score

Not best

Best
score

5

2

Not best

11

2

4.2. Participation
(a) Participation and contract value17
As the contract value increases, the economic and technical requirements become more
binding for suppliers.17 This may adversely affects participation of smaller firms and
encourage joint bidding, as we will see in more detail in the next paragraph.
We have run a simple OLS estimation in order to test for a negative correlation
between the number of actual bidders and the reserve price/contract value, controlling
for some other factors likely to affect participation (e.g., type of scoring rule,
discretional technical scores). Regression analysis confirms the intuition: negative
relationship is statistically significant (t-statistic = -2.92), as well as the negative
correlation is relevant enough (-0.57).

17

The contract value is also the reserve price. Therefore, we will use these interchangeably.
Italian public procurement laws and the Antitrust Authority indicate that participation requirements,
namely revenues and financial capacity, should be proportional to the contract value. Larger contracts
require suppliers to satisfy higher revenue/financial capacity for bidding in that procurement
competition.
17
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Figure 5 – Smoother of number of actual bidders on contract values18
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Figure 5 shows that starting from low values, an increase in the reserve price is
associated with lower participation. Instead, above a certain threshold (€40 millions)
participation slightly increases with the reserve price. This could be explained by
assuming that the participation of the biggest and most experienced suppliers is, to
some extent, “value independent”. In particular, the two outlier tenders have been
competed by 4 and 5 bidders respectively, 3 and 4 of which are joint bidders including
the largest and more experienced players of the IT sector (Accenture, Almaviva, EDS,
IBM, Engineering, Siemens).

(b) Participation and joint bidding
Partnership is a common form of participation to tenders when contracts are “big”.
Joint bidding can be an appropriate strategy for small as well as for big firms. The
latter might be skeptic about bidding autonomously: especially at their first bidding,
they may prefer sharing risks with other (possibly more expert) bidding firms. The
former do not always have enough economical/technical capacity for individual
bidding, so participation necessarily requires partnership. Figure 6-7 support this
hypothesis: joint participation is more frequent for large contracts – indeed, the
correlation with the contract value of share of joint bids over the number of bids in
each lot is relevant and statistically significant. On the other hand, the absolute number
of joint bids also increases over time, as shown in fig. 6 (tenders are time graded).
Notice the effect of extreme values in Figure 7. As the contract value increases, the
18

We computed a Locally Weighted Scatter Plot Smoothing with a bandwidth = 0.8.
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relationship tends to be less steep since the overall participation becomes lower due to
more stringent economic requirements and joint participation proportion tends to 1.

Figure 6 – Individual and joint bidding patterns
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68
.7
19
30 .67
7,
.4
52
9
6.
1
16
60
.3
,1
88
4
.7
26
,
49
78
0.
63
8.
4
,0
26
5
3
40 .31
0,
.2
39
4
7.
69
21
9,
.2
96
92
.
4
18
00
.2
,0
5
0
0.
00
6.
0,
00
52
5.
00
7.
0
05
,0
0
0.
00
7.
0,
05
00
0
14 .00
0,
.0
00
5
1.
4
10
00
.6
,0
78
0
15 .80
0,
.0
00
2
0.
40
70
0,
.3
00
27
27 .64
5,
.6
00
3
4.
70
16
0
.3
,0
32
0
22 .60
0
.3
,
0
0
0
0.
00
13
0,
.8
0
50
0
13 .00
0,
.7
00
5
0.
00
0,
00

14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

contract value

actual bidders/lot

joint bidding(RTI)

Lineare (joint bidding(RTI))

.4

.6

.8

1

Figure 7 – Correlation between proportion (joint bids/number of bids) and contract value
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(c) Awarding rates and participation
Figure 8 shows the correlation between awarding rates and participation. The number
of participations for each supplier is the number of contracts for which she has
submitted an offer.
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Figure 8 – Awarding rates and participation
winning vs participation
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The size of the ball in the graph represents the number of suppliers with a given pair
participations-wins. On the one hand, we observe that most of the suppliers never won
a contract: 26 suppliers bid once and were awarded no contract; 15 firms bid twice
without winning any contract. There are even suppliers facing with 9 bids and still
facing with 0 contracts awarded. On the other hand, there is a smaller number of
suppliers winning quite frequently. The relationship between participations and
number of contracts won seems to be exponential. The number of contracts awarded,
and the probability of winning a contract (number of wins/number of bids) seems to
increase with the participation. The more frequently any supplier bids, the greater her
chances to win a contract.19
Data show some learning effect. After winning and supplying a contract bidders
acquire an informational advantage over potential competitors. Such an advantage is
then exploited in subsequent tenders, allowing experienced suppliers to become more
efficient and so increase (more-than proportionally) their probability to win a contract.
The regression analysis presented in Section 5 illustrates how experience/learning
plays an effective role in suppliers’ bidding behavior, also when controlling for
important elements of the procurement tender design.

4.3. Scoring rules
Contracts for IT services always contain various aspects of quality. Such a
multidimensional problem is treated with MEATs. As well known, MEATs are usually
performed by scoring rules that transform price (and/or other quality aspects) into a
19

The relation between winning and participation is well fitted by a polynomial graph of 2nd order which
shows a more than proportional increase in winning with respect to the number of bids submitted.
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score. The highest score wins the contract.20 As a preliminary analysis, Figure 9 shows
how rebates of winners increase on average when the scoring rule is “linear” with
respect to other rules.21 A scoring rule is said to be linear if score increases
linearly/proportionally as the price declines. This type of scoring rule belongs to the
family that we may call independent scoring rules. Independent scoring rules are such
that one bidder’s score depends on her bid only. Interdependent scoring rules, instead,
are such that the score of any bidder also depends on some (or all) other bids (e.g. the
lowest bid, the highest bid, the average bid, etc.).
We will see below that the former type of rule leads to lower submitted prices on
average. The difficulty or the impossibility to fully infer the buyer’s preferences in
terms of price-quality trade-off in the case of interdependent rule may be at the root of
such a difference. With linear scoring rules, at the contrary, computing the score
associated to any possible price bid and thus defining the appropriate price/quality
strategy is much more easy for suppliers. Simplicity of the rule and predictability of
the score might then stimulate price competition, as Figure 9 seem to suggest.
Interdependent scoring rules tend to yield significant lower rebates on average – about
27% with respect to 46% – than independent scoring rules.22 In particular, “lowest
and/or average price-based” scoring rules induce suppliers to submit bids as close as
possible to what they expect the best or average price will be. The more precise this
estimate is, the more chances the supplier will have in achieving an high score. The
uncertainty, however, may trigger a precautionary or not aggressive bidders’ behavior
on the price side.

20

See Che (1993) and Asker and Cantillon (2008-2006) for theoretical implications and properties of
scoring auctions. See also Dini, Pacini and Valletti (2006) for an in-depth analysis on the design of
scoring rules.
21
“The linear scoring rule is a very simple way to transform price bids into a score. This rule is
Pr iceScore = nn ∗

(Re serve Pr ice − Pr iceBid )
(Re serve Pr ice − Pr iceThreshold ) , where the price threshold is a

described by […]”:
percentage of the reserve price that the procurer may want to introduce in order to stimulate competition
on price.” See Chapter 12, N. Dimitri, G. Piga, G. Spagnolo (2006), “Handbook of Procurement”,
Cambridge University Press.
22
Data also show that price bids tend to be more concentrated under interdependent scoring rules than
under independent scoring rules. The effects of interdependent scoring rules has not been studied by the
theoretical literature. However, first indications from Albano et al. (2007) suggest that interdependent
scoring rules might facilitate some form of coordination among bidders. Lower dispersion found in
submitted bids when scoring mechanisms are of the interdependent type might not conflict with the
authors’ findings.
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Figure 9 – Rebates of winning bidders and scoring Rules
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5. Empirical analysis
In this section we use the dataset to explore the main factors explaining suppliers’
bidding behavior.
Our estimates are based on a non-structural (or reduced form) regression approach. As
mentioned in the literature section we do not wish – and our data do not allow us – to
address issues implying the derivation of a structural model, such as the optimality of
reserve price, checking common value vs. private value paradigm, or estimating
suppliers’ mark-up. Our environment does not appear appropriate for structural
modeling. Buyer’s and suppliers’ behavior would be very hard to describe in
multidimensional procurement environments where, among others, contracts are
highly incomplete, quality is non-contractible and bids are discretionally evaluated by
the committee.23 Optimization should also account for several factors, often
unobservable to the econometrician (or observable at prohibitive costs) or hard to be
modeled. These are for instance the description of a large set of law-driven auctions
rules,24 and the multiplicity of buyers’ needs “dispersed” – and often only roughly
described – in the contract.
The reduced form approach allows us to focus more on the directions rather than
magnitude effects. A standard reduced form regression model is the following:

23

One issue of our data is that sometimes explanatory variables cannot be considered fully exogenous.
Endogeneity may affect for instance the scoring rule or the reserve price. Sometimes their setting at time
t depends on the outcome of the tender at time t-1. Despite we look at data cross-sectionally, some
endogeneity may be still present.
24
These include participation requirements, antitrust regulation for joint bidding, contractor’s payment
rules, etc..
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[dependent variablei] = constant + βk [independent variableik] + εi
and k = 1, … K indexes all our explanatory variables, while i = 1, … N indexes our
observation units. A cross-section estimate is carried out on 132 observations-bids. We
estimate equations using standard OLS.
The analysis of bidding behavior is split in 3 main parts. In the first we test for the
existence of a relationship between price and quality in submitted bids. We do this
running two regressions on quality (technical bids) and price separately, controlling for
some other variable incorporating key aspects of the tender design and the bidding
behavior. Note that regressing quality on price is not exactly the same that regressing
price on quality. For instance, technical bids might be less sensitive to the reserve price
than price bids. But price bids (and scores) are completely independent of the
composition of the evaluating committees, that on the contrary can impact technical
scores.
In the second part we address the issue of what are the main determinants of the
price/quality ratio offered by suppliers. In the third one we investigate the determinants
of the dispersion of technical scores in relation with the composition of the evaluating
committee.
List of variables included in regressions:
Number of bids. The number of bids is a proxy of the level of ex-ante expected
participation/competition to the tender. In mature markets, as IT market is, bidding
suppliers are likely to know each other. This variable can therefore provide
information about what suppliers know about the level of competition in the tender.
In general, this variable can be an important determinant explaining bidding
behavior. Standard theory suggests that in a setting of independent private value
model, prices increase with participation (in procurement, the price decreases with
participation).
Scoring rules. This is a binary variable, 1 for independent and 0 for interdependent
scoring rules, respectively. Our conjecture is that independent scoring rules should
stimulate competition on the economic side, since suppliers are able to compute exante the incremental score associated to additional price reductions. Predictability
of the score may provide suppliers with incentives to bid more aggressively on
price. Interdependent scoring, instead, complicates bidding and the conjectures
suppliers make about other competitors’ bidding behavior. In “average scoring
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rules”, for instance, suppliers should be induced to estimate the average price in
order to bid as close as possible to that level. This “game of expectations” may
push submitted prices around the (estimated) average level rather than the lowest
possible level, and makes price distribution more concentrated towards higher
prices.
Experience. This is measured by the number of previously won contracts for any bid i
at any given time t. We expect more experienced suppliers to better know the
procurement environment and thus ceteris paribus to offer proposals that better fit
the various needs of the buyer. Expert suppliers are expected to be better informed
about the real needs of the buyer and how to put this knowledge into more
comprehensive technical offers. This should yield higher technical scores with
respect to less (or non-) experienced suppliers.
Committees. This is a binary variable, equal to 1 for insiders committees and 0 for
mixed committees (insiders + outsiders). This is a control variable capturing the
fraction of technical score variability due to a different evaluation approach of the
two types of committee.
Bids and scores. We use technical score as a proxy of the ex-ante quality offered by
suppliers. Rebates, financial scores and the price/reserve price ratios are alternative
measures of economic effort.
The number of explanatory variables is kept low. Such parsimony is used to focus
more on those factors that are more likely to explain the dependent variable and, more
important, to avoid losing degrees of freedom given the not very large number of
observations.
Table 5 – Summary Statistics of variables
Variable

Mean

St. Deviation

Min

Max

Obs

N. of Bids

7.56

2.63

3

12

132

Experience

1.73

2.29

0

10

136

Tech. Score (relative)

66.17

14.72

29.17

96.82

132

Financial Score (relative)

72.60

25.53

0

100

132

Rebates
Reserve Price

33.15

13.78

0.37

59.97

132

2.14e+07

1.88e+07

490,634

7.03e+07

20

5.1 Testing for price/quality trade-off
5.1.1. Technical score regression
In this section we investigate the main aspects affecting bidding on quality. In
particular, we investigate whether quality is explained by price, controlling for the type
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of scoring rule, the number of bidders, the type of committee and the bidders’
experience. The type of scoring rule represents one key element of the tender design.
Expected participation/competition and experience are important factors potentially
affecting bidding behavior. We measure quality with the technical score the suppliers
are assigned by the committee at the end of the evaluation process. Quality we
consider is of the ex-ante type, i.e., what the suppliers commit to provide in terms of
organization, quality standards and technological solutions. The equation we estimate
is the following:
Tech_Scorei = const +β1 Financial_Scorei [Rebate i; Bid_Price/Res_Price i]
+β2 ∑t Winningit +β3 N_Bidsi +β4 Scoring_Rulei +β5 Committee_dummyi +εi

(5.1)

Does price explain ex-ante quality? We performed 5 regressions with alternative
measures of the price bid: financial score, rebate and relative price (price bid/reserve
price). All regressions suggest that price explains quality, all the coefficients being
statistically significant. However, the relationship between ex-ante quality and
economical aspects is positive: higher quality is associated to lower prices and vice
versa. The sign in this relation seems to contradict the paradigm of a “price-quality
trade-off” in submitted bids. Nevertheless, this could be not so surprising, because of
some arguments already mentioned above. One first explanation is that it is hard for
the buyer to incorporate complex price/quality preferences in the tender design. If the
awarding mechanism (the scoring rule) does not adequately reflect these preferences,
price and quality may clearly exhibit perverse relationships as the ones observed in the
data.

23
http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper245

24

Albano et al.: Bidding for Complex Projects: Evidence From the Acquisitions

Table 6 – Technical proposals Regression
Tech_Scorei
Financial_Scorei
Rebatei
Bid_Price/Res_Pricei

∑t Winningit
N_Bidsi
Scoring_Rulei
Committee_dummy
Constant term

I.
0.156***
(3.24)
-

25

II.

OLS
III.

IV.

.
V.

-

-

-

-

0.389***
(3.72)

0.364***
(3.47)

0.244**
(2.44)

-1.739
(-0.65)
63.158***
(12.60)
0.29
14.51
132

0.35
15.06
132

-

-

-

-

3.07***
(6.55)
-1.41***
(-2.86)
-5.12**
(-2.00)
-8.964***
(-3.76)
67.202***
(16.27)

3.414***
(7.15)
-0.854**
(-1.97)
-9.625***
(-3.49)
-2.676
(-1.03)
61.092***
(12.62)

3.55***
(7.44)

3.01***
(6.23)
-1.266***
(-2.91)

-11.11***
(-4.14)
-2.857
(-1.09)
56.252***
(13.34)

Adj. R2
0.33
0.35
0.33
F-test
14.09
15.06
17.46
N. Obs.
132
132
132
t-Statistic shown in parentheses; significant levels at *0.10, **0.05, ***0.01.

-38.91***
(-3.72)
3.414***
(7.15)
-0.854**
(-1.97)
-9.625***
(-3.49)
-2.676
(-1.03)
100.00***
(12.08)

-

The results might also be driven by non-contractible quality considerations. Since
many quality dimensions are hard/costly to monitor ex-post, suppliers may anticipate
this at the bidding stage and offer low prices for the “promise” of outstanding quality
(yielding high technical scores), but lower ex-post effective quality.26 A similar effect
is studied in theory by Kim (1998), who builds up a procurement model where the
buyer wishes to acquire a high-quality project by the use of a sealed-bid tendering.
Non-contractible quality of projects implies transaction costs for contract enforcement
and difficulties to ensure that the project is of the desired high quality. In this
framework the author points out that if the buyer commits himself to a firm fixed price
contract,27 the contractor may provide low quality in order to cut down on production
costs.28

25

Tests indicate that the estimated model is not affected by multi-collinearity for independent variables.
F-test indicate that all variables should be included in the regression. Goodness of estimation appears
good: despite parsimony the model is able to explain up 30%-35% of total variance. Further testing
rejects the hypothesis of non-normality in estimated residuals, therefore supporting the choice of a linear
model for our data. These considerations hold also for the price regressions.
26
This is the case of the procurement environment we considered. Monitoring is difficult being quality
widely non-contractible. Moreover, several public procurement legislations (among these we include
Italian procurement laws), provide for limits to the use of customer satisfaction or other subjective
measures of performance to judge contractors’ performance. In this context, it is rather difficult for
public procurers to achieve a full contract enforcement but also to use effective reputational forces. In
our dataset therefore we cannot control for the ex-post quality.
27
Instead of re-tendering in case of undesired outcome.
28
Also note that project complexity can make the estimation of the organizational efforts actually
required (and thus their monetary cost) a very hard task for the suppliers. This affects their ability to
appropriately trade-off price and quality and may produce “optimistically” too low estimates of the
project’s costs.
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The role of other variables
1) Estimates suggest that independent scoring (linear and concave)29 reduces technical
score increases (the sign of coefficients is always negative as reported in Table 6).
Independent rules allow each supplier to determine his financial score unloosed from
his competitors’ behaviour. This provide him with a clear incentive to improve the
price offer. It is worth noting, on the contrary, that interdependent rules (lowest bid and
average scoring) introduce uncertainty also on the price side. Scores become
unpredictable because of the simultaneous presence of both discretional evaluation of
technical proposals and interdependent price scoring. In this context, incentives for the
suppliers to shift effort from quality towards price improvements are expected to be
weaker since the shift can pay for only with a known “rate of return” in terms of
financial score.30
2) The variable ∑t Winningit summarizes the number of past contracts awarded to each
bidding supplier. Experience/learning is what the supplier has learnt during the
contract execution period. Learning can be important in complex procurement like the
ones we are considering. Experience improves the supplier’s understanding of what are
today (and could be in the future) the technological evolutions and the developments
most fitting buyer’s needs, as well as the most important/critical activities among the
ones indicated in the contract. In other words, the contractor learns to make a “custom
tailored suite” and how to exploit this (private) information in subsequent procurement
tenders.
Any single observation, i.e., any single pair of price-quality bid, is associated to a
measure of experience given by the number of contracts previously awarded to the
supplier. Technical scores appear to be positively and significantly correlated with this
variable. Covariates statistical significance is robust to alternative regressions
specifications, with estimated coefficients maintaining stability. Winning one

29

Concave scoring is such that the score increases less than proportionally as price declines. A standard
concave scoring can be as follows: Si = [1 – (Pi/Pb)α ] *PE. Where Si is the score obtained by bidder “i”,
Pi is the price submitted by bidder “i”, Pb is the reserve price, α measures the slope of the curve and PE
is the weight of price in the tender. Concave scoring clearly discourages bidders to bid aggressively, as
soon as the incremental score is made negligible (depending on α) for marginal reductions of Pi. This
rule is sometimes used in procurements where quality plays a significant role and the procurer wishes to
avoid that very low price favours ex-post opportunism from the contractor.
30
With independent scoring rules such a shift can indeed pay: rather than offering X additional
consultants at a cost of say €250.000, to get an uncertain incremental technical score, the supplier can
easily compute the (certain!) incremental score associated to a price reduction of the same amount.
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additional contract allows the supplier to improve the relative technical score by
roughly 3.1-3.6 points, about 6% of relative technical score on average.
3) The number of bids submitted has a negative impact on the technical score
suggesting that the larger the number of bidders the lower the “promised” quality. A
first possible explanation is that more participation shifts the players’ efforts towards
price-competition rather than technical-competition. Again, the expectation that quality
improvements may not be appropriately rewarded (or will do less than price
improvements) may induce suppliers to shift effort from quality to price when
expecting higher participation.
Scoring rule and expected participation appear to interact, and to operate in the same
direction. In point sub 1) we have seen how independent scoring rules encourage
competitors to shift effort toward price. Here we have found that higher participation
in general encourages them to shift effort toward price competition.

4) Despite statistical significance is achieved only when using the financial score as
covariate, the composition of committees seems to affect technical scores in the
conjectured direction. Internal commissions are associated to a lower average technical
score. Insiders tend to discriminate quality proposals more than outsiders, providing
support for the results of the analysis of technical score distributions presented in
section 6.

5.1.2. The determinants of price bids
Symmetrically to the previous regressions, we test whether price bids are explained by
quality, controlling for other variables. We also control for the contract value (reserve
price) since this may effect more directly price bids, in particular the magnitude of
rebates. We measure price bid with the % of rebate. Price bid regression is also
performed as a “check” for results obtained in technical regressions.
The estimated equation is:
Rebate i [Financial_Scorei] = const +β1 Tech_Scorei +
+β2 Scoring_Rulei +β3 ∑t Winningit +β4 N_Bidsi +β5 Reserve_Pricei +εi

(5.2)
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Table 7 – Financial proposals Regression
Tech_
Scorei

Scoring_
Rulei

∑t Winningit

N_Bidsi

Reserve_
Pricei

Constant
term

Adj. R2

Rebatei.OLS(E)

0.33***
(4.50)

15.78***
(7.49)

-2.025***
(-4.35)

1.05**
(2.22)

7.30e-08
(1.02)

-4.55
(-0.73)

0.42

19.97 132

Rebatei.WLS(1)

0.076
(1.46)

21.10***
(9.78)

-0.45
(-0.69)

1.481**
(2.34)

3.28e-07*
(1.86)

-1.59
(-0.21)

0.53

31.04 132

F-test N. Obs

t-Statistic shown in parentheses; significant levels at *0.10, **0.05, ***0.01.
(E) Heteroscedastic affliction; (1) weight: Reserve_Price;

As expected, price and quality are still positively correlated. Estimated coefficients
also show that:
i)

experience reduces rebates, i.e., increases prices;

ii)

higher expected competition lowers the price (increases rebate). This point
is worth stressing. The level of expected competition does not impact
quality as it does for price, although the directions of effects are
unequivocal on both quality and price bid, as shown until now. If the exante quality goes down, the opportunistic decision of decreasing price bid
may be the relative cause in so far as either effects are in response of
expected competition. But we demonstrate below that this first clue of
price-quality trade-off is not confirmed because of the ex-ante quality
unstable sensitivity to expected competition (see results in table 8). This
indirectly supports the idea that quality and price bidding may be set
independently rather than in a (very) coordinated manner by the supplier.
Quality appears to respond more to factors related to the suppliers’
experience. Price, instead, reflects information on expected competition and
the nature of the scoring rule.

iii)

the reserve price seems to play no role in the regression as a control
variable for the dimension of the contract.

iv)

Notice that independent scoring rules induce to lower prices (higher rebate).
This suggests again that simplicity of the rule and predictability of the score
make suppliers’ life easier when bidding on price and induce them to bid
more aggressively. Independent scoring affects financial proposals by
decreasing submitted relative prices (increasing rebates) by 16%-21% on
average.
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6. The determinants of price/quality ratio
In this section we look at bidding behaviour under a different perspective. We
investigate the main elements driving the submitted price/quality ratios. We identify
the main determinants of price/quality ratio by using a price/quality index.31 The index
may be interpreted as a measure of the elasticity of the price with respect to quality.
The price/quality index is as follows:32

Bid Pr icei
Rp

Qi

=

Tech.Scorei

Re serve Pr icec

(6.1)

MaxTech.Scorec

The index displays the following properties.
1. Re serve Pr icec ≥ Bid Pr icei ;
2. Tech.Scorei ≤ MaxTech.Scorec .

 Bid Pr icei
 ≤ 1,
3. 0 ≤ 

Re
serve
Pr
ice
c


and


4. 0 ≤ 


Tech.Scorei

 ≤ 1.
MaxTech.Scorec 

where subscripts “c” and “i” identify contracts and bidders, respectively. As a
consequence, it will also be:

p
5. R Q ∈ [ 0; +∞ ].
i
The price/quality ratio improves when the index decreases. When the price declines,
Price_bid/Reserve_price declines (the rebate increases). This in turn lowers the index,
i.e., improves the price/quality index. At the same time, as the technical score increases
the denominator also increases; this pushes the ratio down, again improving the

31

This is the natural way to measure a price/quality ratio. Alternatively, we could have considered the
total score (sum of technical and price scores). However, this indicator would suffer from the fact that
the effects on price and quality are milked and made indiscernible.
32
Where the reserve price and the upper bound of technical scores are indexed for c = 1…C, the number
of awarded contracts.
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Rp

price/quality index. Therefore, higher quality and lower prices are associated to

Qi

closer to 0.33 With the following equation we estimate the effect of a set of explanatory
variables:

R p

Qi

= const + β 1 Scoring _ R ulei + β 2 N _ Bids i + β 3

∑

t W inning it

+

(6.2)

+ β 4 R e serve _ Pr icei + ε i

Tab. 8 – Price/Quality Index Regression
II.
III.
IV.
V.

I.

R p Qi

OLS

R p Qi

WLS

Num_

Num_

R p Qi

OLS

R p Qi

Den_
WLS

(E)

(1)

-0.267***
(-3.77)

-0.331***
(-3.30)

-0.148***
(-6.56)

-0.21***
(-9.66)

-0.015
(-0.96)

-0.033
(-1.12)

-0.011**
(-2.10)

-0.036***
(-2.63)

-0.086***
(-3.03)

Reserve_Pricei

-5.81e-09**
(-2.44)

Constant term

OLS

VII.
Den_

R p Qi

WLS

R p Qi

WLS

(1)

(2)

-0.031
(-1.24)

-0.026
(-0.71)

-0.027
(-1.03)

-0.015**
(-2.34)

0.0004
(0.08)

0.001
(0.11)

-0.003
(-0.46)

0.010**
(2.31)

0.001
(0.16)

0.031***
(6.21)

0.046***
(4.40)

0.031***
(6.30)

-1.04e-08
(-1.27)

-1.29e-09*
(-1.70)

-3.35e-09*
(-1.89)

1.69e-09**
(1.98)

8.93e-10
(0.30)

1.51e-09**
(2.08)

1.50***
(10.11)

1.84***
(5. 65)

0.8498***
(18.00)

0.97***
(13.81)

0.60***
(11.21)

0.57***
(4.77)

0.62***
(12.80)

Adj. R2

0.19

0.24

0.33

0.53

0.26

0.13

0.26

F-test

8.50

11.59

17.28

37.93

12.29

5.93

12.77

N. Obs.

132

132

132

132

132

132

132

Scoring_Rulei
N_Bidsi

∑t Winningit

(1)

R p Qi

VI.
Den_

t-Statistic shown in parentheses; significant levels at *0.10, **0.05, ***0.01.
(E) Heteroscedastic affliction; (1) weight: Reserve_Price; (2) weight: N_Bids

The first two columns report the results of standard estimation with OLS and robust
regressions (WLS). Weighted Least Squares regression is used to deal with
heteroscedasticity.34 The remaining columns instead report the estimations considering
either the numerator or the denominator, again controlling for heteroscedasticity.

33

Notice that when the submitted price is equal to the reserve price (zero rebate) and the actual technical
R p =1
Qi
score equals the maximum,
, however, this cannot be considered the worst price/quality ratio.
In other words, the index is not defined for extreme values. This also occurs when technical score is
closer to zero and thus the index explodes to infinity although price approaches zero. However, we have
not extreme cases in our dataset.
34
Tests identify the variable(s) source of the heteroscedasticity. We use these variables to weight
observation when running WLS regressions. In the second and last column of Table 8, regressions are
weighted for the reserve price and number of bids according to the results of the test.
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Estimates indicate that both scoring rule and past experience play an important role in
explaining the price/quality ratios. Negative correlations implies overall improvements
in the price/quality index. Scoring rules and experience clearly go towards this
direction, confirming the effects showed in previous regressions. Independent scoring
positively impacts the price/quality ratio achieved by the buyer: about 25%-31% of
improvement in the index (made base for computation the mean value of the index)35
is associated with the use of independent scoring rules instead of interdependent
scoring rules. However, the largest impact occurs on the economic side of competition
(the numerator of the index captures the effect on price side). This is shown by
regressions 3 and 4.
Table 8 reports regressions 5-7 that capture the impact on quality side of competition
(denominator of the index). Experience is quite relevant. One additional contract
awarded improves the price/quality index by 3.4%-8.2%, if referring to its mean value.
Decomposing the estimation, bidder experience has still the strongest impact on
quality as found in the previous regressions (5 to 7). Reserve price variable here is
used as a control variable, in order to account for the variability of the contract value.
In the second column the reserve price is used as instrument to control for
heteroscedasticity.
Finally, notice again the role of expected level of competition (number of submitted
bids). Signs and significance of coefficients confirm the reasoning proposed in section
5.1.2, point ii). Technical proposals (the denominator of the index) are not influenced
by the number of expected bidders (coefficient is not significant), while price does. So,
the price/quality ratio doesn’t show a clear overall improvement when competition gets
fiercer, despite a competition effect is well-rendered on price bids.

7. Evaluating committees
Evaluation of quality proposals may vary significantly, depending on how deeply
people involved in the evaluation process know the procurement environment, the
needs of the buyer and the various details of the contract. Insiders, i.e., Consip IT
experts, know these things much better than any outsider expert. Filling this
35

The mean value of price/quality ratio, as computed on the 132 observations of dataset, amounts to
1.05 (min: 0.55, max: 2.78) and variance to 0.15.
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information gap can be very costly and time consuming for outsiders. Outsiders in the
committee were provided

for,

by law,

to

increase transparency in

the

awarding/evaluation procedures. However, such a transparency may not be costless.
Lack of familiarity with the specific procurement context may limit the ability of
committees to correctly distinguish among proposals with respect to insiders. A lower
dispersion in technical scores, and higher average technical scores may could be
interpreted as the fear of outsiders components of the committees for potential appeals
of suppliers. On their part, day-to-day direct work on projects put insiders in a better
position to fully understand the procurement tender context and to better evaluate
quality proposals. This also enables insiders to better defend their choices in case of
dispute with suppliers.
These conjectures seem to find some support in the data. Table 9 summarizes some
simple statistics on technical scores distinguishing between insiders (committee = 1)
and mixed (insiders + outsiders) committee (committee = 0). Two things are worth
noting:
1) The variability of technical scores with all-insider committees is greater than with
mixed committees. Mean variance is 0.083 vs. 0.058, i.e., 43% greater than in mixed
committees. Mean standard deviation is 0.136 vs. 0.11, 23% greater than in mixed
committees. Dispersion of technical scores is clearly higher with insider committees.
Regression analysis reported in table 9.2 shows that such differences are statistically
more significant, if a zero-intercept regression is run.36
2) Mixed committees are also more generous in rewarding quality with respect to
insiders. Mean technical score is 68.63 and 62.55, respectively, 10% higher with mixed
commissions. The maximum score is 96.82 of outsiders and 93.33 from insiders.

Tab. 9.1 – Summary Statistic on Committee
Statistics
Committee = 0
Mean of Technical Score St. Deviation
0.11
Mean of Technical Score Variance
0.058
Observations (by group)
79
Mean of Technical Score
68.63
St. Deviation (by group)
13.88
Minimum
29.17
Maximum
96.82

Committee = 1
0.136
0.083
56
62.55
15.15
32.29
93.33

36

Imposing the model with a zero-intercept should be reasonable. When number of valid bids is zero
(no participant) there is no reason because dispersion of financial score is different from zero, the same
is for dispersion in technical score.
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Table 9.2 – Evaluation Committees Regression37
OLS

St.Dev_FinScoret
Var_ FinScoret
N_Bidst
Committeet
Constant term

St.Dev_
TechScoret
0.242**
(2.72)

St.Dev_
TechScoret
0.278***
(4.10)

-

-

0.008**
(2.14)
0.032*
(1.89)
0.021
(0.63)

0.01***
(5.43)
0.036**
(2.34)
-

.
Var_
TechScoret

Var_
TechScoret

-

-

0.112*
(1.91)
0.006
(1.50)
0.03
(1.60)
0.003
(0.10)

0.115**
(2.33)
0.006***
(3.80)
0.030*
(1.84)

Adj. R2
0.31
0.92
0.15
F-test
3.85
78.53
2.14
N. Obs.
20
20
20
t-Statistic shown in parentheses; significant levels at *0.10, **0.05, ***0.01.

0.77
23.18
20

8. Conclusions
In this paper we explored the determinants of suppliers’ bidding behaviour, using a
unique dataset of contracts for IT services that Consip awarded on behalf of the Italian
Ministry of Economy and Finance.
One first finding is the absence of a tension between price and quality in observed
bids. Price and quality appear inversely related: higher quality is associated to lower
prices. This results may be due to the difficulty for the buyer to adequately
describe/incorporate her price/quality preferences into the tender design (the scoring
rule). Consistently with Kim (1998), also non-contractible quality considerations might
play a role, as these can shape the suppliers’ incentives towards submitting low prices
for ex-post lower-than-promised quality.
Another finding is that the nature of the scoring rule and past experience appear to be
among the most important determinants of submitted price/quality ratios. Experience
plays a primary role in bidding, positively affecting the level of ex-ante quality and in
general price/quality ratios. Superior information on the procurement environment can
significantly increase the contractor’s probabilities to award future contracts.
Independent scoring rules facilitate bidding and encourage suppliers to be more
aggressive on the price side of the tender. This suggests that interdependent scoring
37

Explanatory variables are indexed to t = 1…20, where t is the contract number. In this field the
observations available are only 20, such that the number of all treated contracts we analyze. In our
estimations we use the dispersion measures of financial scores simply as a control variable. The number
of bidders by lot (contract) is useful in order to control for tender participation that may affect the
expectation of each bidder on quality proposals from competitors, and so the actual distribution of
technical proposals.
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rules are only an obstacle to bidding in already complex procurement environments.
The result has some connections with Lundberg (2005), who shows how bidding
strategies are complicated when the buyer’s trade-off between price and quality is not
announced to bidders. Interdependent scoring rules make in fact buyers’ preferences
rather opaque.
Finally, we find that the distribution of scores for technical proposals is significantly
less dispersed when evaluation committees are composed of “outsiders” (mainly nonIT-Consip experts) rather than “insiders”, suggesting that in the former case
competition is shifted more towards price. Also, outsiders tend to be more generous
than insiders. Risk aversion for appeals may explain this pattern.
Results allow us to give some indications for IT services tender designers:
1. Price and quality. Since scoring auctions may not well incorporate buyer’s
price/quality preferences, other mechanisms such as negotiations or restricted
procedures, could be preferable to award complex IT projects.
2. Scoring rules. Independent scoring rules tend to improve the price/quality ratio
of the buyer with respect to interdependent scoring rules. Improvements are
mainly driven by price reductions, and are likely to be due to the simplicity of
the rule and predictability of the score. This suggests to use independent
scoring, such as a linear scoring rules. This finding seem to go in the direction
indicated in a seminal paper by Che (1993) who shows that when the buyer has
commitment power over, a scoring rule that is linear can implement the optimal
scheme.
3. Committees. We have shown a potential trade-off between transparency and
the effectiveness of bid evaluation process. With all-insider committee the
awarding process might appear less transparent to the market. However, with
respect to non-fully insiders, fully insider committees are more likely to
guarantee fair project evaluation.
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